





Google Chrome




Presented by Alex Nicolaou

The world wide Application Server



TODAY, MOST OF WHAT
WE USE THE WEB FOR ON A
DAY-TO-DAY BASIS AREN'T
JUST WEB PAGES, THEY'RE
APPLICATIONS.

Brian Rakowski,
Product Manager



WOULDN'T
IT BE GREAT,
THEN, TO
START FROM
SCRATCH --



-- AND DESIGN
SOMETHING BASED
ON THE NEEDS OF
TODAY'S WEB
APPLICATIONS
AND TODAY'S
USERS?

2008



FIRST, BROWSERS NEED TO BE MORE **STABLE**. WHEN YOU'RE WRITING AN IMPORTANT EMAIL OR EDITING A DOCUMENT, A BROWSER CRASH IS A BIG DEAL.



Darin Fisher, Software Engineer

BROWSERS ALSO NEED TO BE **FASTER**. THEY NEED TO START FASTER, LOAD PAGES FASTER --

-- AND FOR WEB APPS, JAVASCRIPT ITSELF CAN BE A **LOT FASTER**.



Lars Bak,
Software Engineer



Kasper Lund,
Software Engineer

THEY NEED TO BE MORE **SECURE**. GIVEN WHAT'S KNOWN ABOUT MASS BROWSER EXPLOITS, BROWSERS NEED ARCHITECTURAL CHANGES TO DISADVANTAGE **MALWARE**.



Ian Fette,
Product
Manager

AND WE WANT BROWSERS TO FIND THAT SWEET SPOT BETWEEN TOO MANY FEATURES AND TOO FEW, WITH A **CLEAN, SIMPLE, AND EFFICIENT** USER INTERFACE.



Ben Goodger,
Software
Engineer

FINALLY, GOOGLE CHROME IS A FULLY **OPEN SOURCE** BROWSER.

WE WANT OTHERS TO **ADOPT** IDEAS FROM US --



-- JUST AS WE'VE **ADOPTED** GOOD IDEAS FROM OTHERS.

WHEN WE STARTED THIS PROJECT, THE GEARS GUYS WERE SAYING THAT ONE OF THE PROBLEMS WITH BROWSERS IS THAT THEY'RE INHERENTLY SINGLE-THREADED.



BROWSER



HTML



JAVASCRIPT



PLUGINS




HTML


FOR EXAMPLE, ONCE YOU HAVE JAVASCRIPT EXECUTING, IT'S GOING TO KEEP GOING, AND THE BROWSER CAN'T DO ANYTHING ELSE UNTIL JAVASCRIPT RETURNS CONTROL TO THE BROWSER.




SO DEVELOPERS WRITE APIS THAT ARE ASYNCHRONOUS --



-- AND EVERY NOW AND THEN THE BROWSER LOCKS UP BECAUSE JAVASCRIPT IS HUNG UP ON SOMETHING.




THE GEARS GUYS WERE THINKING ABOUT A MULTI-THREADED BROWSER, BUT THAT LED US TO TALK ABOUT, WELL, INSTEAD OF MULTIPLE THREADS --




-- WHAT IF WE HAVE **MULTIPLE PROCESSES**? EACH HAVING ITS OWN MEMORY AND ITS OWN COPY OF THE GLOBAL DATA STRUCTURES.







IN A TRADITIONAL BROWSER,
YOU ONLY HAVE ONE PROCESS
AND ONE ADDRESS SPACE
THAT YOU KEEP LOADING WEB
PAGES INTO.




WHEN YOU HAVE TOO MANY
TABS OPEN, YOU CAN CLOSE
SOME TO FREE UP MEMORY.



WHEN YOU BRING IN ANOTHER
TAB, YOU USE THE MEMORY
THAT WAS PREVIOUSLY USED.



BUT AS TIME GOES ON, FRAGMENTATION RESULTS -- LITTLE BITS OF MEMORY STILL GET USED EVEN WHEN A TAB GETS CLOSED.




EITHER WE HAVE MEMORY THAT NOTHING CAN REFER TO AGAIN, OR THERE'S A PIECE OF DE-ALLOCATED MEMORY WE STILL HAVE POINTERS TO.




Mike Belshe,
Software Engineer

SO WHEN THE BROWSER WANTS TO OPEN A NEW TAB, IT CAN'T FIT IT IN THE EXISTING SPACE --





OPEN A NEW TAB NOW, AND YOU'RE STARTING FROM SCRATCH.



SO AS YOU BROWSE, WE'RE CREATING AND DESTROYING PROCESSES ALL THE TIME. IF THERE'S A CRAZY MEMORY LEAK IT WON'T AFFECT YOU FOR THAT LONG BECAUSE YOU'LL PROBABLY CLOSE THE TAB AT SOME POINT AND GET THAT MEMORY BACK.






- Do not re-invent the wheel
- Principle of least privilege
- Sandboxed code is malicious code
- Be lightweight
- Emulation doesn't guarantee security




WITHIN 20-30 MINUTES OF EACH NEW BROWSER BUILD, WE CAN TEST IT ON TENS OF THOUSANDS OF DIFFERENT WEB PAGES.

EACH WEEK, "CHROME BOT" TESTS MILLIONS OF PAGES, GIVING OUR DEVELOPERS EARLY RESULTS THEY'D OTHERWISE HAVE TO WAIT UNTIL EXTERNAL BETA FOR.



WE WERE IMPRESSED BY HOW FAST IT IS.



WE ALSO KNEW
THERE WAS A TEAM AT
GOOGLE WORKING ON
ANDROID AND WE ASKED
THEM, "WHY DID YOU
GUYS USE WEBKIT?"




THEY SAID IT USES MEMORY
EFFICIENTLY, WAS EASILY
ADAPTED TO EMBEDDED
DEVICES, AND IT WAS EASY
FOR NEW BROWSER
DEVELOPERS TO LEARN TO
MAKE THE CODE BASE WORK.



BROWSERS ARE
COMPLEX. ONE OF THE
THINGS DONE WELL
WITH WEBKIT IS THAT
IT'S KEPT **SIMPLE**.






-- WE DECIDED IT WAS IMPORTANT TO WORK ON BUILDING A JAVASCRIPT VIRTUAL MACHINE --



-- WHICH IS EXACTLY WHAT THE V8 TEAM IN DENMARK DID.

THE V8 TEAM ARE EXPERTS AT VIRTUAL MACHINES. WHATEVER LANGUAGE YOU WANT TO PUT INTO A VM, THEY CAN TELL YOU HOW TO WRITE IT.




WHEN YOU INTERPRET ONCE AND COMPILE MACHINE CODE, THEN THAT CODE IS YOUR REPRESENTATION OF THE JAVASCRIPT SOURCE CODE AND IT DOESN'T NEED TO BE INTERPRETED, IT JUST RUNS.



JAVASCRIPT ITSELF IS **CLASSLESS**.
 YOU CAN CREATE A NEW OBJECT,
 DYNAMICALLY ADD PROPERTIES TO
 IT AND GO ON.




BUT IN **V8**, AS EXECUTION GOES ON,
 OBJECTS THAT END UP WITH THE SAME
 PROPERTIES WILL SHARE THE SAME HIDDEN
 CLASS AND WE CAN START APPLYING
 DYNAMIC OPTIMIZATIONS BASED ON THAT.





ANOTHER FACTOR
 IN V8'S SPEED IS
 DYNAMIC CODE
 GENERATION.




WHEN OTHER JAVASCRIPT ENGINES RUN, THEY
 LOOK AT THE JAVASCRIPT SOURCE CODE AND
 GENERATE AN INTERNAL REPRESENTATION OF IT
 THEY CAN INTERPRET.






IF YOU DON'T HAVE A REFERENCE TO AN OBJECT ANYMORE, ITS MEMORY CAN BE RECLAIMED BY THE SYSTEM. THAT'S GARBAGE COLLECTION, AND ITS A FAIRLY TRIVIAL PROCESS.




https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=...





IN V8, WE ARE USING **PRECISE** GARBAGE COLLECTION, SO WE KNOW **PRECISELY** WHERE **ALL** OF THE POINTERS ARE ON THE STACK AND THIS GIVES US SEVERAL ADVANTAGES.

ONE IS THAT WE CAN MIGRATE AN OBJECT TO ANOTHER PLACE AND JUST REWIRE THE POINTER.




MEANING **QUICK** GARBAGE COLLECTION ROUND-TRIPS THAT ARE CLOSE TO A FEW **MILLISECONDS**, COMPARED TO PROCESSING ALL 100MB OF DATA WHICH COULD CAUSE **SECOND-LONG** PAUSES.





Chris DiBona,
Open Source Programs Manager





THEY DON'T HAVE
TO PAY US. THEY
DON'T HAVE TO ASK
OUR PERMISSION.

THEY DON'T HAVE
TO SHARE PATCHES OR
REPORT BUGS.*



* THOUGH, IF THEY LIKE, WE HAVE
SYSTEMS IN PLACE FOR THAT.

BUT THEY
CAN **BUILD** ON
WHAT WE'VE DONE
AND BRING THEIR
OWN CREATIVITY
TO IT.



SURE, WE
COULD SHIP A
PROPRIETARY
BROWSER AND
HOLD IT IN.



BUT GOOGLE **LIVES**
ON THE INTERNET.

IT'S IN OUR
INTEREST TO MAKE THE
INTERNET BETTER AND
WITHOUT COMPETITION WE
HAVE STAGNATION.





THAT'S WHY
WE'RE OPEN
SOURCING THE
WHOLE THING. WE
NEED THE INTERNET
TO BE A FAIR,
SMART, SAFE
PLACE.



AS
EXCITED AS
WE ARE ABOUT
BUILDING GOOGLE
CHROME, IT'S
IMPORTANT TO HELP
ALL BROWSERS
BECOME MORE
POWERFUL --

-- TO KEEP
EVOLVING WITH
THE WEB AND
CONTINUING TO
BUILD A **SOLID**
FOUNDATION FOR
MODERN WEB
APPLICATIONS.






Google[®]

Q&A

Thanks!




- **Memory usage falls into three categories: shared, shareable, and private**
- **Windows' Task Manager reports different numbers in different versions**
- **The best way to figure out what Chrome is using is to look at `about:memory` or use Chrome's own task manager (Shift-Esc)**
- **Multiple processes means more memory in minimal configurations but less in the long run**

- **DNS lookups are a surprising source of potential latency, with lookups that are 250ms or more being commonplace**
- **Chrome caches DNS lookups and populates the cache from links in the pages displayed to save you time**
- **about:histograms displays a lot of fun statistics about the workings of the browser, like `DNS.PrefetchFoundName` for prefetch stats**


- **Enabling chrome to share statistics with Google is a powerful way for Chrome users to work together to gather info**
- **Crash reports and usage statistics drive development that's good for everyone**
- **Incognito mode can always be used for specially secure browsing**
- **We hope you enjoy using and contributing to Chrome!**

Multi-Process Architecture




- A single browser process is the master
- Each web site is rendered by a single render process
- Communication between the two is via Chromium's IPC mechanism (named pipes)
- The master process is called a 'broker' and the slave processes are called 'sandboxes'

Anatomy of a Render Process



- The `RenderProcess` talks to the corresponding `RenderHost` in the browser. There is exactly one instance per process and it handles all communication to the browser
- The `RenderView` communicates with the corresponding `RenderViewHost` via the `RenderProcess`

Anatomy of the Browser Process




- The `Browser` object corresponds to a top-level window
- Each `RenderProcessHost` corresponds to each IPC connection to a render sandbox
- The `RenderViewHost` encapsulates rendering specific to a frame/DOM in the `RenderProcess` and handles painting and events

Life of a mouse click



- The Windows message is received on the UI thread of the browser by `RenderWidgetHostHWND::OnMouseEvent`
- `ForwardMouseEventToRenderer` packages the input event into a cross-platform `WebMouseEvent` and sends it to the `RenderWidgetHost`
- `RenderWidgetHost::ForwardInputEvent` creates an IPC
- Then the renderer takes control:
- `RenderView::OnMessageReceived` gets the message and in turn forwards it to `RenderWidget::OnHandleInputEvent`.
- The event goes to `WebWidgetImpl::HandleInputEvent` where it is converted to a `WebKit PlatformMouseEvent` class and passed to the `WebCore::Widget` class inside `WebKit`.

Specific naming and isolation for security



- Specify the policy for each target process
- Spawn the target processes
- Host the sandbox policy engine service
- Host the sandbox interception manager
- Host the sandbox IPC service (to the target processes)
- Perform the policy-allowed actions on behalf of the target process


- Sandbox is given a *restricted token*
- Sandbox is in a Windows *job* object
- Sandbox is confined to its own Windows *desktop* object
- Windows Vista+: sandbox is at the lowest integrity level

- The restricted token means no access to secured objects
- Does a good job on properly configured(?) Windows systems
- Does not handle access to sockets on XP or access to legacy filesystems (FAT32 on USB Keys for example)

- The Job abstraction allows limiting access to system resources that are otherwise unsecured
- Forbids the creation or switch of desktops, modifying screen resolution, clipboard access, event broadcast, etc.
- Crucial for keeping the sandbox process inside its jail away from other windows

- All windows on the same desktop are vulnerable to each other
- Screen scraping is one threat
- Synthesized events is another
- Keylogging is a third
- Isolating the sandboxes to their own desktop carries a small memory penalty but is otherwise effective

Isolation of Resource Loading



- It is assumed that cross-domain restrictions are handled by the renderer
- Handling cross domain rules outside the renderer would introduce a lot of complexity – consider pages that legitimately load resources from many sites versus javascript to do the same
- It is a non-goal of chromium to protect the user from XSS website attacks